The concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) has evolved over time. The introduction of the Internet of Things and Services into the manufacturing environment has ushered in a fourth industrial revolution: Industry 4.0. It is no doubt that the world is undergoing constant transformations that somehow change the trajectory and history of humanity. We can illustrate this with the first and second industrial revolutions and the information revolution. IoT is a paradigm based on the internet that comprises many interconnected technologies like RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) and WSAN (Wireless Sensor and Actor Networks) to exchange information. The current needs for better control, monitoring and management in many areas, and the ongoing research in this field, have originated the appearance and creation of multiple systems like smart-home, smart-city and smart-grid. The IoT services can have centralized or distributed architecture. The centralized approach provides is where central entities acquire, process, and provide information while the distributed architectures, is where entities at the edge of the network exchange information and collaborate with each other in a dynamic way. To understand the two approaches, it is necessary to know its advantages and disadvantages especially in terms of security and privacy issues. This paper shows that the distributed approach has various challenges that need to be solved. But also, various interesting properties and strengths. In this paper we present the main research challenges and the existing solutions in the field of IoT security, identifying open issues, the industrial revolution and suggesting some hints for future research.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet of things was probably introduced by Ashton in 1999 [1] . The IoT can be defined as a set of interconnected things (humans, tags, sensor, and so on) over the internet, which can measure, communicate and act all over the world. The key idea of the IoT is to obtain information about our environment, to understand, control and act on it. The IoT can help us in our daily life, e.g in [2] . Nowadays, the concept of IoT is very broad, it covers many different technologies, services, and standards and it is perceived as the foundation of the ICT market in the next ten years [4] [5] [6] . Consequently, a typical IoT system is a collection of smart devices that interact on a collaborative basis to fulfil a common goal. At the technological floor, IoT deployments may adopt different processing and communication architectures, technologies, and design methodologies, based on their target. For instance, the same IoT system could leverage the capabilities of a wireless sensor network (WSN) that collects the environmental information in each area and a set of smartphones on top of which monitoring applications run. In the middle, a standardized or proprietary middleware could be employed to ease the access to virtualized resources and services. The middleware, in turn, might be implemented using cloud technologies, centralized overlays, or peer to peer systems [5] .
According to Haddara & Elragal [39] , our world today has had multiple industrial revolutions over history. The 1st industrial revolution was the mechanization of production using water and steam power; the 2nd industrial revolution introduced mass production with the help of electric power; and 3rd industrial revolution use electronics and IT to further automate production. In the last few years, the technological advances of ICT provided a set of tools that changed our life as internet, robots, drones, IoT, and IoE. However, things communicate easily through the world-wide network: The Internet. This trend will certainly find its way also into industrial production, which will benefit increasingly from the advances in ICT and computer sciences [40] .
In the context of the IoT, the importance of the distributed approach as an element of the Future Internet of Things has been previously mentioned in the literature [1] . However, there have been no explicit analyses of its features and its challenges. To understand the viability and applicability of this distributed approach, it is necessary to explicitly know its actual features and major principles, including the benefits and disadvantages. Also, as security and privacy are important factors that will influence the adoption of the IoT paradigm, it is essential to know what are the security and privacy challenges -and benefits -of the distributed approach, and what are the most promising approaches in this field. If the challenges are too complex and the benefits too small, it might make sense to focus mainly on the centralized approach for IoT [8.6] . On the other hand, in a distributed approach, not only the intelligence and the provisioning of services are located at the edge of the network, but also various application platforms can collaborate with each other dynamically.
Note that adaptation and self-healing plays a key role in IoT infrastructures, which must be able to face normal and unexpected changes of the target environment. Accordingly, 23 privacy and security issues should be treated with a high degree of flexibility as advocated in [12, 13] . Together with the conventional security solutions, there is also the need to provide built-in security in the devices themselves (i.e., embedded) to pursue dynamic prevention, detection, diagnosis, isolation and countermeasures against successful breaches, as underlined in [12] . Our work analyzes the most relevant available solutions related to security (i.e., integrity, confidentiality, and authentication), privacy, and trust in IoT field with analysis of centralized and distributed approaches. We also focus on proposals regarding security middleware's and secure solutions for mobile devices, as well as ongoing international projects on this subject. The main topics analyzed are shown in Fig. 1 . In literature, other surveys deal with issues related to the IoT paradigm: In [1] analyzes the IoT enabling technologies and existing middleware's, also from an application point of view, and presents security and privacy open issues together with standardization, addressing, and networking ones; [8] considers the security and privacy challenges only under a legislative point of view, with attention to the European Commission directives. In [2] discusses the main research contexts (i.e., impact areas, projects, and standardization activities) and challenges in IoT, dealing also with data confidentiality, privacy, and trust as regards security requirements; [15] is on Internet of Underwater Things and presents only few hints to security issue; [10] investigates the advantages and disadvantages of centralized and distributed architectures in terms of security and privacy in IoT with an analysis of the principal attack models and threats; [12] provides a general overview on various IoT aspects, such as the involved technologies, the applications, the cloud platforms, the architecture, the energy consumption and security issues, the quality of service and data mining implications; [11] focuses only on the specific issue of trust management in IoT. The contribution of this paper is compared in Table 1 with respect to the surveys: it clearly embraces with a breaded breath all security-related facets and of course it includes more recent references on the subject. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the available approaches regarding confidentiality and access control in IoT. It deals with privacy and trust issues, respectively with related work on Distributed IoT. Section 3 shows the security and privacy policies enforcement in IoT applications. Section 4 shows the main challenges and promising solutions in the design and deployment of the security mechanism. Finally, Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
At the Hanover Fair in 2011, the term Industry 4.0 was first coined. In October 2012, the Working Group on Industry 4.0, presented a set of implementation recommendations to the German government. The term Industry 4.0 spring from a project in the high-tech strategy of the German government. The project advocates the computerization of the manufacturing industry. It is also known as the 4th industrial revolution. In more concise meaning, industry 4.0 is based on the technological concepts of cyber-physical systems, Internet of Things (IoT), which enables the Factory of the Future (Fofo) [39] .
Subsequently, companies have come up with solutions to this concept, supported by governments, mainly European (especially German), but also by countries such as the United States, Japan and China, indicating that this was an industrial and strategic era Industries. Weyer et al. [40] stated that in Industry 4.0, field devices, machines, production modules and products are comprised as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that are autonomously exchanging information, triggering actions and controlling each other independently. In [40] further explained that factories are developing into intelligent environments in which the gulf between the real and digital world is becoming smaller. The strong bias of the electrotechnical and hierarchical world of factory automation will transition to smart factory networks, that enable dynamic reengineering processes and deliver the ability to respond flexibly to disruptions and failures. Central aspects of the Industry 4.0 can be divided into three paradigms namely: The Smart Product, the Smart Machine and the Augmented Operator. The main idea of the Smart Product is to extend the role of the work piece to an active part of the system. The products receive a memory on which operational data and requirements are stored directly as an individual building plan. The paradigm of the Smart Machine describes the process of machines becoming Cyber-Physical Production Systems (CPPS). The third paradigm mentioned above, the Augmented Operator, targets at the technological support of the worker in the challenging environment of highly modular production systems [40] . By 2020, the Fourth Industrial Revolution will have brought us advanced robotics and autonomous transport, artificial intelligence and machine learning, advanced materials, biotechnology and genomics. These developments will transform the way we live, and the way we work. However, the big question is, how secure are these systems, machines and other connected devices to provide the needed support and communication.
CENTRALIZED VS DISTRIBUTED APPROACH
In today's world, cloud continues to expand, it has taken to many forms. From the virtual partitions on mainframes to virtualization, cloud services and mobile technologies, the cloud is composed of diverse platforms and approaches. However, IoT stands to be one of the new applications that will be closely related to cloud technologies. The IoT inherited the concept of the original Internet, which was (and still is) composed of networking nodes (servers and computers) all linked together via global networks, and which is used for everything from data transfers and stock quotes to web surfing and media streaming. 
Contributions to Distributed IoT
The concept of a distributed IoT have existed before now. In fact, various official documents consider it as one of the possible strategies that can push the dream of the IoT into the real world, and it has been explicitly mentioned that the development of decentralized autonomic architectures and the location of intelligence at the very edge of the networks are issues that need to be addressed [2] . However, some key questions must be answered to make the most of this strategy in the real world, such as the specific situations on which the network intelligence should be distributed [1] . To answer these questions, it is necessary to study the specific requirements of applications. For example, whether an application needs support for distributed ownership of data [3] . This and other issues that have been raised by government and individuals are being carefully considered by the research community.
In the last few years, researchers have carried various studies in so many areas of distributed IoT architectures. For example, [46] combine the concept of the web of things (using web protocols to implement the IoT) with the concept of triple spaces (using semantic web techniques to exchange knowledge in a distributed local shared space) to create a distributed environment where devices located in both ends can collaborate with each other through Internet services. In another example, which follows a more holistic point of view, Ning and Liu describe a heterogeneous system known as U2IoT that comprises two subsystems: Unit IoTs, which are basic local cells that provide solutions for special applications, and Ubiquitous IoT, which comprises the different Unit IoTs plus other managers and controls the collaboration between all entities. The Moreover, the location of intelligence at the edge of the network is implicitly considered, as digital entities range from simple devices to abstract entities made up of various distributed devices. Therefore, its building blocks [9] could be used in the future to create fully distributed IoT applications. Some concrete building blocks, which can help to build a distributed IoT, have been indirectly studied in other research projects. For example, the HYDRA project [10] developed an open source middleware that allows legacy devices to provide web services over the Internet -directly or indirectly. HYDRA also provides some tools that can be used to enable collaboration, such as a device and service discovery interface. This interface can make use of ontology to describe the available services, achieving semantic consistency. Another project, SENSEI [11] , was more focused on providing a consistent interface to access the services of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) islands. But it produced other relevant results, such as semantically-enabled resource directories, and local management systems that benefit of the existence of such directories. Finally, other projects, like CUBIQ [12] and SMARTPRODUCTS [13] , studied and developed various P2P-based distributed mechanisms, such as a distributed publish/subscribe system and a distributed storage system. Beyond theoretical research, there are numerous companies and start-ups that are making use of cloud technologies to provide IoT services. The key idea is that all edge devices and intranet of things will send their information periodically to an application platform located in the cloud. This platform stores all the data and provides specialized API interfaces that can be used by 3rd parties to create their IoT applications. There are various approaches for implementing these types of platforms: from closed environments where even the sensors are controlled by the company [4] to more open platforms that allow the integration of external devices and databases [5] . Most of these solutions are completely centralized: edge systems act mainly as data acquisition networks, and application platforms from different vendors are not prepared to interact with each other. Yet there are some platforms that, pursuing the idea of creating private and hybrid clouds, can be deployed in a local environment [14] . These platforms not only enable the existence of local intelligence but also can exchange information and services with external systems, thus they can easily become instances of the distributed IoT. In IoT distributed architecture, multiple services are merged with minimal human intervention. 
Security issues in distributed IoT systems
Although academic research on the topic of security in the Internet of Things is still in its infancy, there is a substantial body of work that analyses the existing challenges and possible protection mechanisms. However, existing research mainly provides an overview of the generic problemswithout considering the impact of specific features such as the ones studied in this paper. To understand the specific security issues of a distributed IoT, it is necessary not only to analyses the impact of the distributed IoT principles (collaboration, edge intelligence) over the existing threats and attacker models. Once the analysis of the threats and attacker models is finished, we can study what are the main challenges in the design and deployment of the security mechanisms. Such study, which will be performed in this section, will help to point out specific problems that must be considered if we want to bring the distributed IoT architectures to the real world. Moreover, within this study, we will explore not only existing IoT security mechanisms, but also proposed scheme solution approaches that could be used to provide security in a distributed IoT environment.
In recent time, security have been identified by researchers as the major challenge and concern hindering the successful implementation or the use of IoT in real world. IoT architectures are supposed to deal with an estimated population of billions of objects, which will interact with each other and with other entities, such as human beings or virtual entities. And all these interactions must be secured somehow, protecting the information and service provisioning of all relevant actors and limiting the number of incidents that will affect the entire IoT. However, protecting the Internet of Things is a complex and difficult task. The number of attack vectors available to malicious attackers might become staggering, as global connectivity (''access anyone'') and accessibility (''access anyhow, anytime'') are key tenets of the IoT. The threats that can affect the IoT entities are numerous, such as attacks that target diverse communication channels, physical threats, denial of service, identity fabrication, and others [21] . Finally, the inherent complexity of the IoT, where multiple heterogeneous entities located in different contexts can exchange information with each other, further complicates the design and deployment of efficient, interoperable and scalable security mechanisms. Some of the previously mentioned challenges, alongside with the security mechanisms that should integrate awareness mechanism that can be used to create the foundation of intrusion detection and prevention mechanism are explained below.
Attacker models and threats
As aforementioned, to understand how the different approaches presented in Section 2.5 should be secured in the future, it is firstly necessary to enumerate and analyze the attacker models. These models have been defined in a way that they can be applied to both centralized and distributed IoT approaches. Note, however, that the concept of 'perimeter' in the Internet of Things is a bit fuzzy: an attacker can control part of the network, but due to the inherent distributed nature of the IoT, it is nearly impossible for an attacker to fully control the whole system. As a result, an attacker can be both 'internal' and 'external' at the same time. These attacker models, categorized by threats, are introduced in the following paragraph. 
IOT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS: AUTHENTICATION, CONFIDENTIALITY AND ACCESS CONTROL
The heart of every system is the security and what makes a system secure is the ability to guard against internal and external attacks. This section analyzes in depth three key security requirements: authentication, confidentiality, and access control, with a special focus on IoT systems. IoT, in fact, enables a constant transfer and sharing of data among things and users to achieve goals. In such a sharing environment, authentication, authorization, access control and non-repudiation are important to ensure secure communication. In this context, the lack of Computing resources (i.e., processing power, storage) and ad hoc nature of such networks requires to Taylor existing techniques to this new environment. The seminal contributions in such a field will be illustrated together with a critical review of open issues that deserve further investigation [10] . However, having this in mind, we need to understand the security challenges of IoT and suggested solutions. See fig2.
Fig 2: Overview of Security Challenges in IoT Channels

Authentication and confidentiality
For authentication, the approach presented in [18] makes use of a custom encapsulation mechanism, namely smart business security IoT application Protocol Intelligent Service Security Application Protocol; it combines cross-platform communications with encryption, signature, and authentication, to improve IoT applications development capabilities by establishing a secure communication system among different things.
In [19] it introduced the first fully implemented two-way authentication security scheme for IoT, based on existing Internet standards, specifically the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, which is placed between transport and application layer. This scheme is based on RSA and it is designed for IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) [3] . The extensive evaluation, based on real IoT systems, shows that such an architecture provides message integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity with enough affordable energy, end-to-end latency, and memory overhead. For confidentiality and integrity, in [20] it is analyzed how existing key management systems could be applied to the IoT context. It is possible to classify the Key Management System (KMS) protocols in four major categories: key pool framework, mathematical framework, negotiation framework, and public key framework. In [20] the authors argue that most of the KMS protocols are not suitable for IoT. In fact, key pool protocol suffer insufficient connectivity; mathematical protocol make use of the deployment knowledge to optimize the construction of their data structures, but such an approach cannot be used in IoT since client and server nodes are usually located in different physical locations; combinatorics-based KMS protocols suffer both connectivity and scalability/authentication; negotiation protocol make use of the wireless channel and its inherent features to negotiate a common key, however they cannot be suitable for IoT because client and server nodes usually belong to different networks and they should route the information through the Internet to be able to talk with each other. Hence, the KMS protocols which might be suitable for some IoT scenarios are the Blom [21] and the polynomial schema [22] , whose computational overhead is quite low in comparison to a Public Key Cryptography (PKC) operations (i.e., public key framework). However, for such schemes, several countermeasures are required to manage device authentication and face man-in-the-middle attacks. For example, [23, 24] present a framework for IoT based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
A more practical approach, as [25] , proposes a transmission model with signature-encryption schemes, which addresses IoT security requirements (i.e., anonymity, trustworthy and attack-resistance) by means of Object Naming Service (ONS) queries. Root-ONS can authenticate the identities and platform creditability of Local ONS servers (L-ONS) by a Trusted authentication Server (TAS), and the TAS gives a temporary certificate to validated L-ONS, which can apply for inquiry services many times with the certificate in the validated time. A security ONS query service with anonymous authentication provides credentials only to authorized and trusted L-ONS, preventing the illegal ONS to enquire information from things. In the transmission process, Remote Information Server of Things (R-TIS) wraps the information of things into multiple encryption layers with the routing node's public key. The encrypted data are decrypted at each routing node, until the Local Information Server of Things (L-TIS) receives the plain text. Meanwhile, the nodes can check the integrity of received data and the creditability of routing path in the transmitting procedure. Such a transmission model results very weak in terms of attackresistance due to the adoption of hop-by-hop encryption/decryption behavior. It appears that a unique and well-defined solution able to guarantee confidentiality in a IoT context is still missing, as also asserted in [26] . It is worth to note that many efforts have been conducted in the WSN field [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] , but several questions raised; Are the WSN proposals adaptable to the IoT environment, considering both the heterogeneity of the involved devices and the different application contexts? How and at which network layer to handle authentication? Is it feasible to reuse the traditional security mechanisms (e.g., encryption algorithms) or it is better to start from new solutions? How to handle the different keys? Which kind of key distribution mechanism is the most suitable? How to ensure an end-to-end integrity verification 
27
mechanism to make the system more resilient to malicious attacks? Very recent works started addressing such questions. For example, an authentication protocol for IoT is presented in [33] , using lightweight encryption method based on XOR manipulation for anti-counterfeiting and privacy protection, to cope with constrained IoT devices. From the WSN context, a user authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks is also proposed in [34] . It enables a remote user to securely negotiate a session key with a sensor node, using a lean key agreement protocol. In this way, it ensures mutual authentication among users, sensor nodes, and gateway nodes (GWN), although GWN is never contacted by the user. To apply such a scheme to resource constrained architectures, it only uses simple hash and XOR computations, as in [33] . The authentication and access control method presented in [35] aims at establishing the session key based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), another lightweight encryption mechanism. This scheme defines attribute-based access control policies, managed by an attribute authority, enhancing mutual authentication among the user and the sensor nodes, as well as solving the resourceconstrained issue at application level in IoT. These preliminary answers partially address afore listed questions because they specifically target the problem of lightweight ciphering in pervasive environments. Further efforts are required to complement these lean mechanisms with standardized protocols for authentication and a clear definition of one or more authorities aimed at guaranteeing the expected confidentiality within the IoT infrastructure
Policy Enforcement in IoT
Policy enforcement refers to the mechanisms used to force the application of a set of defined actions in a system. More in details, policies are operating rules which need to be enforced for maintaining order, security, and consistency on data. With reference to IoT scenarios, in literature are still present neither viable solutions nor detailed analysis on this subject. Only few works describe how to manage policies enforcement. [22] provides an overview of network security, security policies, policy enforcement and firewall policy management systems. About policy enforcement, it is proposed to use security services such as authentication, encryption, antivirus software and firewalls, to protect the data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In [23] the languages regarding the definition of obligations and policies are classified into two categories. On the one hand, there are policy enforcement languages, which generally simplify the specification and interpretation of policies; however, they lack the formal semantics needed to allow the verification of the policies themselves by means of formal proofs. On the other hand, there are policy analysis languages, which allow the formal policies analysis and the expression of a large variety of obligations. In this work, it is introduced a policy language which aims at combining the advantages of both policy enforcement and analysis languages. Formalizing policy enforcement has several advantages: it reduces the gap between the specified policies and their deployment, thus it ensures that the policies are correctly applied in the system. To formalize policy enforcement, the target system should be modeled and then the effects of the application of the policies should be described. More in details, policies are enforced using reference monitors, and a set of active rules specifies that a set of actions should be executed after the detection of some events, if some conditions are met.
However, this language does not provide the operational semantics needed to dynamically enforce and manage obligations in a policy managed system. [25] pays its attention to the various types of policy languages, such as WS-Policy (Web Services-Policy) and XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language), exploited in different systems. In fact, low level enforcement mechanisms can vary from system to system. Thus, it is difficult to enforce a policy across domain boundaries or over multiple domains. Before applying policies across domain boundaries, it is desirable to know which policies can be supported by other domains, which are partially supported, and which are not supported. In [26] it is proposed and implemented a simulation environment using semantic model mapping and translation for policy enforcement across domain boundaries by means of a semantically-rich language: Web Ontology Language (OWL), which can be used to model both policy languages and enforcement mechanisms. For example, in a healthcare environment, the cooperation and communication between pharmacy, hospital and medical school are essential. They have their own policy enforcement mechanisms to protect their own proprietary data and patient's records. The problem is that there are more and more collaborations and communications among these domains, therefore a crossdomain policy enforcement becomes an essential component. However, in most cases, these domains use different policy languages to define their policies and these specific policies are executed on their own platforms. When a new cooperation or communication is required between two stranger domains, we do not know how many policy rules from the stranger domain can be enforced by current enforcement mechanisms. So, in most cases, the technical departments from these two domains have to work together to evaluate whether or not it is possible to make their systems interoperating. The same problem also exists in social networking environment (e.g Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn). Most existing social networking sites have privacy configurations based on their own enforcement mechanisms. When two social networking sites or two healthcare domains need to communicate or collaborate with each other, they have to rebuild or reconfigure their systems to make sure these activities are consistent with their own and their partners policies. Expressing security policies to govern distributed systems is a complex and error-prone task. Because of their complexity and of the different degrees of trust among locations in which code is deployed and executed, it is challenging to make these systems secure.
Moreover, policies are hard to understand, often expressed with unfriendly syntax, making it difficult for security administrators and for business analysts to create intelligible specifications. In [24] it is introduced a Hierarchical Policy Language for Distributed Systems (HiPoLDS), which has been designed to enable the specification of security policies in distributed systems in a concise, readable and extensible way. HiPoLDS design focuses on decentralized execution environments under the control of multiple stakeholders. It represents policy enforcement using distributed reference monitors, which control the flow of information among services (i.e., SOAs) and have the duty to put into action the directives output by the decision engines. For example, an enforcement engine should be able to add or remove security metadata such as signatures or message authentication codes, encrypt confidential information, or decrypt it when it is the case. In [95] the focus is on the enforcement of privacy issues in e-commerce applications (e.g., eBay). There exist two main paradigms to protect the customer privacy: one relies on the customer trustworthiness; the other one insists on the customer anonymity. The proposed paradigm hides the 28 customer real identity and only data which cover the actual resources he/she is looking for can circulate. Such data will be orchestrated through the network to raise potential matches, and each node will use certified email to send the customer a matching offer in a standardized format. [26] introduces a formal and modular framework allowing to enforce a security policy on a given concurrent system. In fact, one of the important goals of the software development process is to prove that the system always meets its requirements. To deal with this problem, two different approaches are proposed. The former is a conservative enforcement: the program should be terminated as soon as it violates the security policy even if the current run could be partially completed. The latter is a liberal enforcement: the execution of the process is not aborted if it could be partially satisfied. With this approach, more properties are enforced than with the conservative one, but the program may terminate without fully satisfying the security policy. Therefore, the conservative enforcement will generate fault negative, while the liberal enforcement will generate fault positive and no one of them reach the desired result. In [26] the liberal enforcement is developed, which can be further extended to handle the conservative approach. More in details, an extended version of the Algebra for Communicating Process (ACP) [27] , designed for specifying concurrent systems guarantee the enforcement of security and privacy policies, although they are essential to ensure a safe deployment of IoT paradigm. Note that it is important to identify the enforcement mechanisms suitable for the specific IoT context, finding an equilibrium between the guarantee of security and privacy issues and the computing efforts requested by the exploited mechanisms themselves. Some efforts have already been done to define the proper languages for the specification of privacy policies, but a standard which addresses specifically IoT paradigm is still missing.
Privacy in IoT
IoT finds application in many different fields, for example: patients remote monitoring, energy consumption control, traffic control, smart parking system, inventory management, production chain, customization of the shopping at the supermarket, civil protection. For all of them, users require the protection of their personal information related to their movements, habits and interactions with other people. In a single term, their privacy should be guaranteed. In literature, there are some attempts to address such an issue. In [27] a data tagging for managing privacy in IoT is proposed. Using techniques taken from the Information Flow Control, data representing network events can be tagged with several privacy properties; such tags allow the system to reason about the flows of data and preserve the privacy of individuals. Although exploiting tagging within resource-constrained sensor nodes may not be a viable solution because tags may be too large with respect to the data size and sensitivity, therefore they generate an excessive overhead. Clearly, in this case it is not suitable for IoT. In [30] a user-controlled privacy-preserved access control protocol is proposed, based on context-aware anonymity privacy policies. Note that privacy protection mechanisms are investigated: users can control which of their personal data is being collected and accessed, who is collecting and accessing such data, and when this happens. In [32] it is presented Continuously Anonymizing Streaming data via adaptive cLustEring (CASTLE). It is a cluster-based scheme which ensures anonymity, freshness, and delay constraints on data streams, thus enhancing those privacy preserving techniques (e.g., kanonymity) that are designed for static data sets and not for continuous, unbounded, and transient streams. More in details, [29] models k-anonymity on data streams and defines anonymized clusters exploiting the quasi-identifier attributes of tuples in order to preserve the sensitive data privacy. In [34] , the traditional privacy mechanisms are divided into two categories: Discretionary Access and Limited Access. The former addresses the minimum privacy risks, to prevent the disclosure or the cloning of sensitive data; whereas the latter aims at limiting the security access to avoid malicious unauthorized attacks. [34] analyzes the privacy risk that occurs when a static domain name is assigned to a specified IoT node. In this work the authors propose a privacy protection enhanced DNS (Domain Name System) for smart devices, which can authenticate the original user's identity and reject illegal access to the smart device. The scheme is compatible with widely used DNS and DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) protocols. In [36] it is presented a fully decentralized anonymous authentication protocol for privacy-preserving target driven IoT applications. Such a proposal is based on a multi-show credential system where different showing of the same credential cannot be linked together, therefore avoiding the generating keys to be discovered. The system defines two possible roles for participant nodes: users, which represent the nodes originating the data and data collectors, which are responsible for gathering the data from authorized users. Users can anonymously and unlikable authenticate themselves in front of data collectors proving the owning of a valid Anonymous Access. To summarize, privacy requirement in IoT is currently only partially covered and there is a wide space of research issues to be investigated, referring to the need to define privacy policies starting from a well-defined model [29] and the correspondent development, dealing with the scalability and the dynamic environment which characterizes IoT scenarios. In fact, capturing privacy requirement in the very early stages of development is essential for creating sufficient public confidence and facilitate the adoption of novel IoT systems.
Trust in IoT
The trust concept is used in various contexts and with different meanings. Trust is a complex notion about which no definitive consensus exists in the scientific literature, although its importance is widely recognized. A main problem with many approaches towards trust definition is that they do not lend themselves to the establishment of metrics and evaluation methodologies. Moreover, the satisfaction of trust requirements are strictly related to the identity management and access control issues. Works [32, 37] focus on trust level assessment of IoT entities. The authors assume that most smart objects are human-carried or human-related devices, so they are often exposed to public areas and communicate through wireless, hence vulnerable to malicious attacks. Smart objects have heterogeneous features and need to cooperatively work together. The social relationships considered are: friendship, ownership and community, since users are friends among themselves (i.e., friendship), users own the devices (i.e., ownership) and the devices belong to some communities (i.e., community). Malicious nodes aim at breaking the basic functionality of IoT by means of trust related attacks: selfpromoting, bad-mouthing and good-mouthing. The trust management protocol for IoT proposed in [39] is distributed, encounter-based, and activity-based: two nodes that come in touch to each other or involved in a mutual interaction can directly rate each other and exchange trust evaluation about the other nodes, so they perform an indirect rate which seems like a recommendation. The reference parameters to trust evaluation are: honesty, cooperativeness, and community-29 interest. Therefore such a dynamic trust management protocol is capable of adaptively adjusting the best trust parameter setting in response to dynamically changing environments in order to maximize application performance. A similar approach to provide a trustworthiness evaluation is carried out in [32] in the so called Social Internet of Things (SIoT). This paradigm derives from the integration of social networking concepts into IoT, since the objects belonging to the IoT infrastructure can establish social relationships in an autonomous way with respect to their owners. The challenge addressed in [35] is to build a reputation-based trust mechanism for the SIoT which can effectively deal with certain types of malicious behaviors aimed at misleading other nodes, to drive the use of services and information delivery only towards trusted nodes.
Identity and authentication
It is essential to consider how to manage identity and authentication in the Internet of Things, as multiple entities (e.g. data sources, service providers, information processing systems) need to authenticate each other to create trustable services [25] . When defining these security mechanisms, we also must consider some of the inherent features of the Internet of Things. As interactions can be quite dynamic, the entities of the network might not even know in advance which partners can be used to create a certain service. Vehicular networks (VANETs [26] ) are an example of this: cars are expected to provide data not only to devices located on the roadside but also to other cars. Besides, if billions of things are going to be interconnected, it is necessary to manage their identities in a scalable way. In a centralized IoT architecture, some of these challenges are inherently simpler. In this approach, the application logic is mainly located in one central entity (e.g. a cloud-based IoT application platform) that provides a limited set of well-known entry points (e.g. APIs). Both data providers, such as sensors, and information consumers, such as user applications and other customers, connect to this central entity. Consequently, all the authentication logic can be centralized in this entity or in an identity provider associated with it. In case there are data providers that have their own identity provider, there are no scalability problems, as such identity providers can establish a relationship of trust with the central entity (a N-to-1 scenario). Note that if an IoT complies with the collaboration principle (Collaborative IoT), it might be possible to make use of a federated identity management system, where all the service providers belong to the same circle of trust. This simplification cannot be found in purely distributed IoT architectures, which fulfil both the collaboration and edge intelligence principles. In this context we find a dynamic Nto-N scenario, where data providers are no longer passive and are able to acquire and process information from other sources. Moreover, due to the edge intelligence principle, local users can query local information providers directly, without intervention from external entities. As a result, authentication logic must be present in every service provider -including the tiniest of objects. Note, however, that things do not exist in a vacuum: they usually belong to a specific group, are in a context, and are owned by certain entities. These aspects must be considered.
Protocol and Network Security
A secure communications channel is, in most cases, a byproduct of a successful authentication (e.g. server authentication or mutual authentication using protocols such as TLS/DTLS). This process will make use of certain user credentials, such as shared keys or X.509 certificates. If there is a limited set of well-known centralized application providers (i.e. central entities), the distribution and management of these credentials becomes easier, as it is possible to preload information in the devices. However, in distributed IoT architectures, extra challenges arise: any entity can connect with any other entity at any time, these entities might not know each other in advance, and limited devices can exchange information with other limited devices. Therefore, in this scenario key management becomes a significant problem. There are some additional challenges related to the computational resources available to things. When opening a secure channel, devices should be able to negotiate the actual parameters of that channel, such as algorithms (e.g. RSA vs. ECC), strength (AES-128 vs. AES-256), and protection mechanisms (only integrity vs. confidentiality and integrity). The first reason is obvious: constrained devices might not be able to implement certain configurations. There is another reason, though: adaptability. Depending on various factors such as the level of criticality of the data, it might not be necessary to apply strong protection mechanisms to an information flow (e.g. confidentiality and the on/off status of a street light). Another challenge is the need to analyze the number of security protocols that can be implemented within a constrained device. In fact, it is necessary to carefully study whether existing Internet protocols should be adapted to this context or not. Finally, things that can be accessed directly (e.g. in the distributed IoT approach) need to be careful about the overhead caused by incoming connections (e.g. multiple incoming connections that require the use of public key cryptography).
PROPOSED SCHEME APPROACHES
There have been very few advances in the management of access control policies for distributed IoTs. In fact, it is not trivial to apply existing access control approaches to completely distributed environments. For example, there are scalability and consistency issues when storing the list of users and their associated access rights in access control lists (ACLs). Role-based access control (RBAC) mechanisms need to define the different roles that users can take, which might be different in various contexts even if they refer to the same type of entity (e.g. custodian vs. janitor). Finally, RBAC policies that use attribute certificates [34] need of an infrastructure that allows validating such certificates in a cross-domain environment. Note, however, that due to the specific features of the Internet of Things, it is possible to consider certain factors such as context as part of the access control model [35] . Consequently, with adequate technological support, certain policies (e.g. only authenticated users located within my vicinity during working hours can access today's reports) can be easily implemented. Besides, there are various simple strategies that could be used whenever the things belong to a certain group for example, the access control logic could be pushed to specific trusted entities, which will act as token-granting services à la Kerberos (i.e. a thing will grant access to anyone that has a valid signature created by a trusted entity). In another approach, the access control logic can be implemented within the things themselves, but relying only on locally-defined roles (e.g. a doctor from another hospital must retrieve his locally-issued role before interacting with the local things). A drawback of all these strategies is that users must first access the trusted entity before requesting information from the things.
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Other suggested scheme approaches
As the Internet of Things inhabits the Internet ecosystem, it is important to provide support for existing security protocols. In fact, the security of IoT-designed web transfer protocols, such as CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol), is largely dependent on the implementation of these security protocols [36] . Some protocols can be implemented without any major changes. For example, there are commercial implementations available of DTLS for constrained devices [37] . However, other protocols need to be adapted due to the complexity of their design. Such protocols must achieve a trade-off between simplicity and compatibility. For example, one approach seeks to apply IPsec to constrained environments by balancing link-layer security and IPsec security [38] . As for the distribution of the credentials, there are various strategies that could be used to tackle this problem. As whenever things belong to a local group, it is possible to have one or various entities in charge of managing and distributing the credentials. Also, in scenarios where clients and servers know each other in advance, it is also possible to use certain symmetric keybased protocols, which can provide good properties such as high resilience to attacks [39] . Finally, beyond the optimization of these security protocols, there are various researchers that are pursuing the implementation of fast and compact cryptographic algorithms. There are various research areas, which are not mutually exclusive: from the design of novel hash entity. Therefore, data providers do not need to implement any kind of access control logic: they will send all their data to those whom they trust (i.e. the central entity). As a side effect of this configuration, both data providers and information consumers must completely trust the central entity, as it will store the information generated by all network entities. On the other hand, purely distributed IoT architectures must deal with all previously mentioned challenges: management of heterogeneous policies, multiple enforcement points, etc.
Nevertheless, the overall privacy of the network improves once the things can control directly who accesses their own data. Observe that additional mechanisms must be implemented whenever the collaboration principle is applied to centralized IoT architectures (e.g. tools for maintaining consistency between access control lists, resource delegation mechanisms). Note also that we need to manually configure the direct links between the intranets and the external entities in networks that only comply with the edge intelligence principle.
CONCLUSION
The real spreading of IoT services requires customized security and privacy levels to be guaranteed. By 2020, it is no doubt that Industrial Revolution 4.0 will have brought us advanced robotics and autonomous transport, artificial intelligence and machine learning, advanced materials, biotechnology and genomics. The broad overview provided with this survey arises many open issues, and shed some light on research directions in the IoT security field. More in details, a unified vision regarding the insurance of security and privacy requirements in such a heterogeneous environment, involving different technologies and communication standards is still missing. Suitable solutions need to be designed and deployed, which are independent from the exploited platform and able to guarantee: confidentiality, access control, and privacy for users and things, trustworthiness among devices and users, compliance with defined security and privacy policies. Research efforts are also required to face the integration of IoT and communication technologies in a secure middleware, able to cope with the defined protection constraints. The main goal of this paper was to provide an explicit analysis of the features and security challenges of the distributed approach of the Internet of Things, to understand what is its place in the Future Internet. Distributed computing is an essential technique for internet of things (IoT) to off-load the computation from the cloud servers as well as reduce the transmission bandwidth requirements. There are numerous challenges that must be solved, such as assuring interoperability, reaching a business model, and managing the authentication and authorization of entities. it is possible not only to push/pull data only when needed, but also to implement specific privacy policies. Besides, additional trust and fault tolerance mechanisms can be specifically created for this approach. These and other benefits show that this approach is useful and applicable to the real world. As a final note, we would like to stress that both centralized and distributed approaches can coexist with each other, providing the foundations of a full-fledged Internet of Things.
